What did the selected poll say?
Field Institute / California Poll’s selected estimate put Tom Bradley at 49.0% and George Deukmejian at 42.0%. On the chart’s stated basis, that was D +7.0. The corresponding recorded outcome margin was R +1.2, for a 8.2-point difference in the margin.
What actually happened?
Field's final survey favored Bradley 49–42; the official count reproduced in Field's audit gave Deukmejian 3,881,014 votes to Bradley 3,787,669.
Field's audit reports Bradley ahead by 19,429 among precinct voters and Deukmejian ahead by 112,774 among absentee voters, producing the 93,345-vote statewide margin. Two county absentee splits were estimated.
Why might the poll have missed?
Field's February 1983 assessment discusses Republican absentee mobilization, the handgun initiative, minority turnout and racial bias. These are its post-election interpretations rather than a randomized decomposition of polling error. Evidence status: pollster interpretation; multiple causes.
What has not been established?
A wrong poll cannot by itself establish racial concealment. Turnout, absentee mobilization, undecided voters, response patterns and timing can interact. Calling the gap the Bradley effect does not resolve which mechanism caused it.
How should we use this example?
Separate the documented vote arithmetic from the explanations offered afterward. Then compare turnout assumptions, absentee participation and respondent composition using evidence collected before and after the election.
Field’s reported Bradley 49 / Deukmejian 42 estimate is compared with all counted gubernatorial votes from the official count reproduced in Field’s audit. The raw D−R margin is used. The post-election explanation is the pollster’s assessment, not a proven causal decomposition.
What to carry forward
The Bradley effect is a hypothesis about mechanisms, not a complete explanation established by the miss itself.